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ABSTRACT: The article presents and discusses estimates of social and economic indicators for 
Italy and its regions in benchmark years roughly from Unification to the present day: life expec-
tancy, education, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, and the new Human Development 
Index (HDI). A broad interpretative hypothesis, based on the distinction between ‘active’ and 
‘passive’ modernization is proposed to account for the evolution of regional imbalances. In the 
lack of active modernization, Southern Italy converged thanks to passive modernization . However, 
this was more effective in life expectancy, less successful in education, expensive and as a whole 
ineffective in GDP. As a consequence, convergence in the HDI occurred from the late nineteenth 
century to the 1970s, but came to a sudden halt in the last decades of the twentieth century. 
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1. Introduction 
Italy’s regional disparities have been vastly debated, but a full reconstruction of the historical 
pattern is not yet satisfactory. Still there is uncertainty about the North-South divide around the time 
of Unification (Daniele and Malanima 2007; Felice 2013),1 the determinants of regional imbalances 
over the short and the long-run (Felice 2012), as well as inequality (Vecchi 2011). Some consensus 
has been reached for the trend of per capita GDP in the XX century: here the evidence shows the 
failure of Southern Italy to catch-up with the rest of the country (Daniele and Malanima 2007; Fe-
lice 2011). A major question, however, has been largely overlooked in the economic history debate 
but can no longer be eluded: is it possible that the performance of Southern Italy is not so bad, after 
considering indicators of well-being such as the Human Development Index (henceforth HDI)? 
This article takes seriously the problem of the South (or questione meridionale). Its first goal is 
to go beyond the measurement of mere economic growth, by providing the new HDI introduced by 
United Nations (UN) in 2010 and its components in benchmark years from Unification until these 
days. Most of the estimates presented are completely new, while only few others have been previ-
ously published2 (for a detailed discussion of sources and method, see the Appendix). This way we 
aim to contribute to two emergent branches of the economic history literature: on HDI and on the 
measurement of regional inequality. On HDI, the works by Crafts (1997, 2002) and Prados de la 
Escosura (2010, 2014) are focused on cross-country comparisons and do not present sub-national 
figures. As far as Italy is concerned, Brandolini and Vecchi (2013) offer long-run estimates of hu-
man development and other well-being indicators for the whole country, but not for single regions. 
These details are presented in a seminal book by Vecchi (2011), where a dashboard approach is pre-
ferred to the construction of composite indicators. On the measurement of regional inequality, sev-
eral works have been published for a growing number of European countries including Italy (Crafts 
2005; Schulze 2007; Buyst 2010; Rosés, Martínez-Galarraga and Tirado 2010; Combes et al. 2011; 
Felice 2011). Our article presents the most up-to-date estimates of regional GDP for Italy but for the 
first time extends coverage to other dimensions of well-being. 
The second goal of the article is to discuss the difference between “active” and “passive” mod-
ernization, which, in our view, can explain the Italian historical regional patterns. We consider 
“modernization” as the process of catching-up not only for GDP but for a wider range of dimen-
sions. In this sense, this work adopts a clear-cut approach because the three dimensions of HDI − 
                                                 
1
 For the long-run evolution of GDP in Central and Northern Italy, see Malanima (2011). 
2
 See Conte, Della Torre and Vasta (2007) for life expectancy and Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi (2011) for GDP 1938-
2001.  
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longevity, knowledge and resources − are all basic and different components of modernity and thus 
we consider all of them and their interactions in discussing modernization in Italy.  
How can a society modernize in these three dimensions? A possible answer leads us to the dis-
tinction between “active” and “passive” modernization. According to Cafagna (1988), there is an 
active modernization when one or more political or social actors take up the challenge and engage 
in “modernizing” a country. These actors implement a coherent strategy and are usually organized 
in a “historic bloc” (Gramsci 1957): they control key institutions and enjoy support from the pre-
vailing ideology and cultural milieu. Examples are not only the Liberal Italy, but also Prussia, Rus-
sia, or Japan; by this regard, active modernization can be considered as a complement to the Ger-
schenkron’s (1962) approach on economic backwardness and catching-up and on the Allen’s (2011) 
“standard development model”. Instead, we have passive modernization when a society embarks 
upon some sort of modernization without the role of a dominant “bloc”: that is, without implement-
ing a proper strategy, but rather as a result of an adaptive-sub optimal pattern. The two forms of 
modernization can be seen as the consequence of different kinds of institutions. Active moderniza-
tion can be associated to the idea of “inclusive” political and economic institutions, as defined by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012, pp. 74-81), where the whole society pursues the declared goals, and 
we have “identification” between the elite which advocates modernization and the rest of the com-
munity. In their view, inclusive economic institutions facilitate the “engines of prosperity”, that is, 
technology and education. Similarly, passive modernization can be related to “extractive” political 
and economic institutions, where the elites have the interest to pursue some modernization in order 
to grasp the resulting extra output, yet preventing the rest of the population from taking any ad-
vantage of it. 
Differently from Cafagna (1988, p. 237), we think that modernization can be implemented not 
only at the national, but also at the regional and local level. We have regional active modernization 
when local elites actively participate to the modernizing process, by sharing common values and 
coherently implementing the views of the national “historic bloc”. When Italy was unified, there 
were two different institutional settings: one in the South which was characterized by extractive po-
litical and economic institutions; another one in the Centre-North, where institutions were more in-
clusive (Felice 2013). Such a divide, which has a legacy with  the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, has 
remained until our days: for instance, organized crime in the South is an important economic insti-
tution severely altering market competition and enforcing economic rules different from those ap-
plicable in the rest of the country, raising entrepreneurial costs and creating monopolies that dis-
courage innovation. Although political institutions were formally the same, at least until the crea-
tion of regions in the 1970s, they worked rather differently. Indeed, towards the end of the twentieth 
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century a part of local institutions in the Centre-North became paradigmatic of good administration 
(buon governo) and inclusiveness, just like in the South these institutions were frequently paradig-
matic of inefficiency and nepotism (Putnam 1993). As a consequence, we point out that, while ac-
tive modernization took place at the national level and in the Northern and Central regions, in 
Southern Italy passive modernization was dominant.3 
Our analysis suggests that the effectiveness of passive modernization in promoting convergence 
significantly changed according to the different dimensions of human development. Indeed, extrac-
tive societies may accept modernization as long as its elites’ vested interests are not undermined by 
the resulting change, because they do not want become “economic losers”. An improvement in life 
expectancy does not modify the socio-institutional setting of Southern Italy. Things are considera-
bly different in the case of education, for which we can rely upon an established international litera-
ture: the idea of a causal relation between unequal distribution of power and underinvestment in 
public goods was first put forward by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), who looking at the New 
World economies stressed the link between inequality, concentration of political power and low in-
vestments in  education; later on, among others, Galor, Moav and Vollrath (2009) argued as in 
agrarian contexts with extractive institutions − as Southern Italy was − elites have little interest in 
promoting education, since marginal returns are lower than in industrial contexts and, moreover, 
educated peasants would have more incentives to emigrate. Arguably, modernization in GDP is 
even more difficult, under extractive institutions, because extractive elites prefer to draw income 
from rentier activities rather than from competitive ones which would be more risky and would 
pose a serious challenge to their power. For these reasons, we hold that passive modernization is 
more difficult to be implemented in GDP than in education; and that in this latter it is, in turn, more 
difficult than in life expectancy. Indeed, in Italy passive modernization was enough to bridge the 
gap in longevity, but it turned out to be less effective in education and even less in GDP. At the 
same time, passive modernization also made the economic and social system of Southern Italy 
comparably weaker, and thus more fragile to exogenous shocks. 
In Section 2 the origin and the characteristics of the new HDI are introduced. Sections 3 and 4 
focus on the historical evidence. At the same time, we will discuss the inequality pattern in the light 
of the interpretative framework proposed. Did Southern Italy converge in some dimensions more 
easily than in others, and why? Is there something we can learn from the Italian experience which 
can be profitably extended also to other countries and regions? The article is intended to address 
these issues, and its main findings are summed up and discussed in Section 5, as well as in the con-
                                                 
3
 The very idea of a passive attitude of Southern Italy’s towards modernization dates back to the age of the French Re v-
olution: Cuoco (1861), in his seminal work written in 1800, called “passive” the Naples 1799 Revolution, which was 
brought there by the French army. 
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clusion. An extended Appendix provides detailed regional data and discusses sources and all tech-
nicalities.  
2. HDI: proxies and procedures   
The dream of having a synthetic proxy in order to measure the economic development of a 
country has a long story, with early attempts dating back to the 1970s (e.g., Morris 1978).4 A turn-
ing point came in 1990 when the UN (UNDP 1990) proposed to capture the multidimensional na-
ture of human development through three components of human life (longevity, knowledge and in-
come), normalized to an index varying from 0 to 1, according to the formula:  
 
x-index = 
  x valueminimum  -   x valuemaximum
  x valueminimum  -   x valueactual
      (1) 
 
and then weighted through an arithmetic mean. The HDI presented by UN had a significant suc-
cess in the formula that was finally established with the 1995 Report: 
 
1995HDI =1/3(Le−index)+1/3(E−index)+1/3(I−index)     (2) 
 
Le-index is the life expectancy index, longevity: (Le−25)/(85−25), measured in years. E-index is 
the education index, knowledge, in turn made up of two thirds of literacy rate (LR) and one third of 
gross enrolment ratio (GER); for both the indicators, the minimum and maximum thresholds are 0 
and 100, respectively. I-index is the income index, resources: [ln(GDPpc)−ln(100)/ln(40,000)− 
ln(100)], measured in PPP dollars (UNDP 1995, p. 134). 
In 2010, on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary Edition, the UN introduced a new HDI which, 
also trying to respond to the criticisms, made various changes at the previous one. First of all, in-
come is now measured by GNI instead of GDP; the former (the income of all residents, even of 
those living abroad including international remittances and foreign aids) seems more suitable to 
measure the standard of living. Secondly, proxies for education are now provided by combining, 
with same weight, the mean years of schooling and the expected years of schooling. Furthermore, 
all the maximum thresholds are now empirical, rather than theoretical, i.e., they correspond to the 
maximum value observed in the whole sample; some minimum values are revised too, for life ex-
                                                 
4
 For a complete cost-benefit analysis of using composite indices of development, and on the trade-off between 
“mashup indices” and dashboard of single components, see Ravallion (2012).  
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pectancy passing from 25 years to 20, for GNI being now empirical (the minimum value observed 
in the whole sample). However, arguably the most important change is the introduction of the geo-
metric mean instead of the arithmetic mean. The change in the functional form accepts the criticism 
to the previous form, by reducing the perfect substitutability of the three different dimensions and 
penalizing unbalanced development. Accordingly, the formula of the new HDI is now: 
 
2010 HDI =(Le−index)1/3∙(E−index)1/3∙(I−index)1/3      (3) 
 
Now, Le-index is: (Le−20)/(82.3−20), measured in years. E-index is: [(MYSI*EYSI)1/2/0.951], 
where in turn MYSI is the mean years of schooling index (MYS/13.2) and EYSI the expected years 
of schooling index (EYS/20.6) (for the education index, all the minimum thresholds are still zero). 
I-index is: [ln(GNIpc)−ln(100)/ln(108,211)−ln(163)], measured in PPP dollars (UNDP 2010, p. 
216). 
Although the 2010 HDI improved considerably the previous version, for its use in historical 
perspective an intermediate choice seems to be more adequate. Indeed, Gidwitz et al. (2010) sug-
gested to use an hybrid version of the two methodologies. The “hybrid” HDI is well suited to pro-
vide a long-term view because it allows to better examining past progress and even because there is 
a large availability of data for old indicators. It combines the “old” indicators, the “new” maximum 
and minimum values or goalposts,5 and the new functional form being calculated as a geometric av-
erage, not an arithmetic one: 
 
Hybrid HDI = 
3/1
20  -  83.2
20  -  Le






 ∙ (LR2/3 ∙ GER1/3)1/3 ∙ 
3/1
ln(163.3)  -  .7)ln(106,769
ln(163.3)  -  ln(GDPpc)






  (4) 
 
The debate is going on and Prados de la Escosura (2014) has proposed a different solution: the 
Historical Index of Human Development (HIHD), which combines the old indicators with the geo-
metric average, but assumes increasing returns for the social dimensions of the index, thus trans-
forming them with a convex achievement function. Although the author offers good reasons for his 
assumption, in this work we have chosen not to use his index, because we are interested in compar-
ing our data with the new HDI of the United Nations. 
                                                 
5
 Maximum and minimum values are, respectively: 83.2 and 20 for life expectancy; 115.82 and 0 for the gross enrol-
ment ratio; 99 and 0 for literacy rate; 1 for the combined education index; 106,769.7 and 163.3 for GDP per capita 
(Gidwitz et al. 2010, p. 9). 
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3. HDI: putting Italy and its macro-areas in comparative perspective  
Since we adopt a long-term perspective, we calculate the hybrid HDI employing our new esti-
mates. Thus, Figure 1 compares our results with data for a large sample of countries, which we 
combined to produce estimates of the hybrid HDI.6 Accordingly, we have drawn three lines which 
identify the different levels of HDI: the threshold of 0.5, the one at 0.8 and finally the threshold of 
0.9, considering this latter the entrance in the sphere of the very high level of development.7 A gen-
eral convergence process emerges, being the less developed countries in the late XIX century, par-
ticularly the European South Periphery (ESP) countries and Japan, faster than the most advanced 
ones, i.e. European Core (E-core) countries and Western Offshoots (WO), for the entire period. 
However, the story is more complicated and part of this convergence is probably due to the upper 
limit of the index. 
 
Figure 1. Hybrid Human Development Index: Italy vs. different groups of countries (1870-2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: for HDI Prados de la Escosura (2010) and for Italy our own data, data for population are from Maddison 
(2009). Note: for Italy the benchmark are: 1871, 1891, 1911, 1931, 1938, 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 
2007. E-core: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands , Switzerland, United Kingdom; ENP: Austria, Fin-
land, Ireland, Norway, Sweden; ESP: Greece, Portugal, Spain; WO: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States. 
                                                 
6
 We gratefully thank Leandro Prados de la Escosura for sharing with us his dataset. 
7
 These thresholds have been used by the UN (UNDP 2009, p. 15). Since the 2010 Report, absolute thresholds have 
been substituted by relative ones (UNDP 2010, pp. 26-28). However, we prefer to maintain the old UNDP’s criterion 
because, due to scarcity of data, the number of countries we consider is much smaller and the relative thresholds would 
be upward biased. 
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HDI for each group of countries is weighted for population. Data for single countries are presented in Felice and Vasta 
(2012, Table 1). 
 
Looking at Figure 1 we can have interesting information on the Italian long-run performance. In 
1871, Italy had a very large gap with most of the countries of the sample. This gap was large, alt-
hough less wide, even in the 1930s, when Italy reached the 0.5 threshold. By 1981, the gap with 
other countries was reduced considerably. In particular, Italy reached the 1870 E-core countries lev-
el only in 1911. This interval reduced later on and Italy reached the 1929 E-core countries HDI lev-
el in 1951. During the Golden age, this gap decreased significantly and, in the 1970, the Italian HDI 
was very close to that of the E-core countries. Thus, by considering the absolute value of the index 
there is a general convergence towards the leading countries, although in the last years this process 
seems to proceed slower. However, this convergence must be regarded as spurious, given the nature 
of the index which has an upper bound and is based on a linear transformation of its components, as 
already emphasized by Sen (1981, p. 292). Indeed, the absolute change and even more the growth 
rate are seriously biased in favor of countries with a low HDI; consequently, when comparing HDI 
performances, the alternative Shortfall Reduction Method (henceforth SRM) is preferable (as shown 
in detail in the next section), while when comparing HDI absolute values a cardinal scale can be 
more informative than a nominal one.   
 
Figure 2. Different measures of Human Development (Italy 1871-2007) 
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Figure 2 computes the 2010 HDI and the hybrid HDI in both nominal and cardinal terms, allow-
ing us to better clarify the Italian performance in comparative perspective. If the growth of the val-
ues for both indices is clear, it does not allow Italy to improve its position in the ranking (the cardi-
nal scale). Italy started as 16th in the ranking in 1871 and reached the highest position (15th) of her 
pattern in 1971 at the end of the Golden age, but at the beginning of the new century is placed 20th. 
After presenting the Italian regions in Figure 3, we compare the rank of each of the five Italian 
macro-areas with the developed countries but Italy (Figure 4). The patterns show relevant differ-
ences. Firstly, the South and the Islands follow roughly the same path and they both remain at the 
bottom of the ranking for the entire period. Secondly, the other three macro-areas have a different 
pattern: they are in better position since the first years after Unification and they have reached a po-
sition close to the mid of the ranking by 1970. Finally, in the later years there is a convergence to-
wards the bottom of the ranking of the various macro-areas: this decline is due not only to sluggish 
growth of GDP since the 1990s, but also to a remarkable falling back in the total enrolment ratio 
(Felice and Vasta 2012, Table A.5), which is part of a wider deterioration in Italy’s human capital 
(Nuvolari and Vasta 2012). 
 
 
Figure 3. Italy’s regions and macro-areas 
 
Notes: our estimates are at the historical borders; Molise was created in 1963 from Abruzzi’s southernmost part; to have 
uniformity in the long run it was not reported. Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli were assigned to Italy after WWI (the lat-
ter included Istria, lost after WWII). 
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Figure 4. Rank of hybrid HDI for Italian macro-areas (1870-2007) 
 
Sources: our own elaboration. 
4. The hybrid HDI and its components: regional estimates 
This section introduces and discusses the new estimates on hybrid HDI, presenting the series 
for all Italian regions and comparing them with those available for the main developed countries 
(Section 4.1). Moreover, it analyses the dynamic of each single component of the HDI for macro-
areas (Sections 4.2-4.4), while regional data are presented in the Appendix. 
 
4.1. The hybrid HDI 
  Table 1 presents regional estimates of the hybrid HDI for benchmark years from 1871 to 
2007. In order to make clearer the results, we have colored the Table from a lighter to darker ac-
cording to the different levels of HDI reached. Around 1871, the leading Italian region was Pied-
mont, with an HDI (0.380) relatively high by international standards: lower than E-core countries, 
but higher than ENP and considerably higher than ESP countries (see Figure 1). Conversely, 
around the time of Unification Southern Italy was considerably backward, scoring a HDI a bit 
lower than ESP. 
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Table 1. The hybrid HDI for Italy’s regions, 1871-2007  
Regions 1871 1891 1911 1931 1938 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2007 
Piedmont 0.380 0.457 0.517 0.582 0.625 0.677 0.734 0.793 0.828 0.855 0.888 0.900 
Aosta Valley      0.651 0.732 0.781 0.817 0.833 0.867 0.898 
Liguria 0.346 0.436 0.514 0.605 0.648 0.698 0.747 0.802 0.826 0.853 0.886 0.899 
Lombardy 0.347 0.435 0.482 0.568 0.614 0.664 0.730 0.791 0.826 0.854 0.890 0.906 
North-West 0.359 0.439 0.498 0.578 0.623 0.672 0.734 0.793 0.827 0.854 0.889 0.904 
Trentino-Alto A. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.597 0.639 0.651 0.717 0.780 0.806 0.846 0.890 0.901 
Veneto 0.318 0.412 0.488 0.561 0.603 0.650 0.722 0.789 0.823 0.860 0.891 0.907 
Friuli n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.596 0.622 0.676 0.718 0.787 0.821 0.857 0.896 0.910 
Emilia 0.273 0.374 0.485 0.573 0.611 0.657 0.730 0.800 0.839 0.866 0.905 0.918 
North-East 0.298 0.397 0.487 0.572 0.611 0.655 0.724 0.792 0.827 0.861 0.897 0.911 
Tuscany  0.273 0.377 0.472 0.580 0.617 0.642 0.706 0.789 0.829 0.859 0.895 0.911 
The Marches 0.256 0.338 0.434 0.533 0.582 0.622 0.706 0.783 0.834 0.871 0.903 0.914 
Umbria 0.272 0.346 0.442 0.554 0.596 0.618 0.703 0.783 0.825 0.859 0.893 0.906 
Latium 0.264 0.398 0.486 0.552 0.588 0.648 0.727 0.789 0.828 0.869 0.898 0.917 
Centre 0.271 0.372 0.472 0.562 0.600 0.640 0.715 0.788 0.830 0.865 0.897 0.914 
North-East-Centre  0.285 0.385 0.480 0.567 0.606 0.648 0.720 0.790 0.829 0.863 0.898 0.913 
Abruzzi 0.217 0.277 0.385 0.504 0.543 0.572 0.679 0.767 0.813 0.853 0.888 0.901 
Campania 0.241 0.306 0.375 0.504 0.545 0.590 0.677 0.748 0.789 0.827 0.857 0.874 
Apulia 0.215 0.286 0.364 0.474 0.518 0.579 0.673 0.756 0.798 0.836 0.858 0.875 
Basilicata 0.200 0.259 0.348 0.450 0.491 0.505 0.646 0.737 0.785 0.818 0.862 0.873 
Calabria 0.195 0.249 0.348 0.460 0.507 0.545 0.653 0.733 0.784 0.813 0.855 0.871 
South 0.222 0.286 0.370 0.487 0.529 0.574 0.671 0.750 0.794 0.830 0.861 0.877 
Sicily 0.233 0.284 0.366 0.495 0.536 0.569 0.661 0.741 0.791 0.826 0.859 0.873 
Sardinia 0.216 0.302 0.393 0.498 0.554 0.590 0.689 0.768 0.804 0.844 0.875 0.891 
Islands 0.231 0.287 0.372 0.495 0.540 0.573 0.668 0.748 0.794 0.831 0.863 0.878 
South and Islands 0.226 0.286 0.370 0.490 0.533 0.574 0.671 0.749 0.794 0.831 0.862 0.877 
Centre-North 0.319 0.411 0.490 0.572 0.614 0.659 0.726 0.792 0.828 0.860 0.894 0.909 
Italy 0.282 0.360 0.442 0.546 0.582 0.631 0.709 0.778 0.817 0.850 0.883 0.899 
Sources: our elaborations from tables 2-4 and the methodology in Gidwitz et al. (2010). Note: the cells are 
emphasized in white up to the threshold of 0.5, light gray from 0.5 to 0.8 and dark gray over 0.8; moreover, 
the values which passed the threshold of 0.9 are in white color. 
 
By the eve of WWI, only two Italian regions, Piedmont and Liguria, had been able to pass the 
0.5 threshold: the lag to E-core was about twenty years. During the interwar years, all the Italian re-
gions but Basilicata passed the 0.5 threshold. In 1938, the leading region was Liguria, which scored 
a HDI (0.648) close to the E-core countries. Southern Italy (0.533) was above all the ESP countries 
and still at the same level of Japan. This was by no means a success story. At the end of the eco-
nomic miracle (1950-1973), two regions, Liguria and Emilia, were above any other European coun-
tries and also Japan. The North-Eastern and Central regions have reached the North-Western ones, 
but Southern Italy also had improved: the picture is still rosy, the less developed Italian regions 
(Basilicata and Calabria) still ranking at about the same level of the ESP countries. In the last dec-
ades, Italy and its regions failed to follow the improvements of other ESP countries. By 2007, alt-
hough roughly half of the Italian regions have overcome the 0.9 threshold, Italy is still below that 
threshold, unlike all groups of countries, included the ESP one (Figure 1). As anticipated, given the 
very nature of the indicator, measuring performance in HDI in terms of absolute change or the 
growth rate could be misleading. In order to test for convergence, following Sen (1981) and the first 
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Human Development Report (UNDP 1990, pp. 13-14), we employ the alternative SRM, which 
measures the fall in the gap between a region’s initial level and the upper limit, according to the 
formula: 
 
SRM=
 uepast x val  -   x valuemaximum
 uepast x val  -   x valueactual
      (5) 
  
The SRM reflects the effort to close the gap with the highest possible value by assuming that a 
given percentage of reduction is equally viable at different initial levels of development: for exam-
ple, going from a value of 0.900 to a 0.950 means that there is a 50 per cent reduction of the short-
fall, i.e., the same if the value passes from 0.500 to 0.750; conversely, if we used the growth rate 
method the two cases would be 5.5 per cent for the former versus a 50 per cent for the latter. 
Figure 5 displays beta-convergence according to the SRM. Unlike with the growth rate method, 
which would display a remarkable convergence (Felice and Vasta 2012, p. 17), the picture is puz-
zling. The curve is slightly positive, which means a lack of convergence; furthermore the regional 
variance around the expected trend is remarkably high. And yet even with the SRM we record some 
convergence, limitedly to the North-Eastern and Central regions. Instead the Southern regions did 
not converge, with a couple of exceptions. In short, we could argue the existence of “three” Italies. 
One is made up of the North-Western regions, with a high initial HDI and a growth lower than what 
expected. The second Italy is the bulk of the Southern regions, scoring a low initial HDI but also a 
disappointing growth over the long-run. Finally, there are the North-Eastern and Central regions, 
with an average initial level of HDI and a growth rate much higher than what expected. This is true 
in particular for the Central regions plus Emilia, which are the big winners; two Southern regions, 
Sardinia and above all Abruzzi, are close to this group, whereas Veneto, lies in between the Central 
regions and the North-Western ones. 
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Figure 5. Regional convergence according to the SRM, over the long-run (1871-2009) 
 
Sources: elaborations from Table 1.  
 
When considering the sub-periods, the broad picture presented above is not always confirmed. 
In Figure 6, we can observe that there was indeed convergence during the economic miracle (1938-
1971 for our benchmark) and, to a minor degree, in the previous interwar years (1911-1938); con-
versely, divergence was at work during the Liberal age (1871-1911 for our benchmark), and later 
on, even more strongly, in the last decades.  
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Figure 6. Regional convergence according to the SRM, by sub-periods 
 
Sources: elaborations from Table 1.  
 
To sum up, for the Italian Mezzogiorno we can talk of a half-success in terms of convergence − 
i.e., of a half failure: the growth of the Southern regions in human development could have been 
better, particularly in the first and in the last period; conversely, that of the North-Eastern and Cen-
tral regions is satisfactory. In order to investigate the determinants of these patterns, we now turn to 
a more in-depth analysis of each single HDI component. 
4.2. Life expectancy 
Table 2 presents estimates of macro-area inequality in life expectancy, measured as a compo-
nent of the new HDI.  
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Table 2. Macro-area inequality in life expectancy at birth, according to the hybrid HDI compo-
nent, 1871-2007 (Italy=1) 
Macro-areas 1871 1891 1911 1931 1938 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2007 
North-West 1.137 1.114 1.014 1.009 1.018 1.000 0.991 0.989 0.991 0.995 0.998 0.999 
North-East 1.082 1.166 1.143 1.059 1.063 1.043 1.010 1.001 0.995 1.004 1.009 1.007 
Centre 0.915 1.089 1.149 1.054 1.060 1.039 1.012 1.019 1.014 1.008 1.005 1.008 
South 0.817 0.819 0.886 0.923 0.947 0.951 0.987 0.996 0.998 0.996 0.993 0.994 
Islands 1.124 0.861 0.839 0.944 0.966 0.971 1.011 1.000 1.011 0.998 0.993 0.991 
 
Years (Italy) 33.10 39.34 44.21 54.92 58.26 65.74 70.34 72.37 74.40 77.40 79.80 81.10 
Sources: our elaborations from various sources; for full details see the Appendix, Table A1. 
 
In the second half of the XIX century Southern Italy lagged behind the rest of the country. 
However, in the course of the XX century the North-South divide was completely bridged, it is only 
in the last two decades (1981-2007) that the Mezzogiorno fell back, although at a very slow rate. 
What determined such an impressive convergence in life expectancy? Firstly, the convergence in 
life expectancy was a world phenomenon (Prados de la Escosura 2014), as a consequence of the ep-
idemiological or health transition, which mostly in the first half of the XX century marked the pas-
sage from infectious to chronic disease as the main cause of death (Cutler, Deaton and Lleras-
Muney 2006). A brief historical overview highlights the fundamental role played by State interven-
tion and suggests a strong case for passive modernization in Southern Italy. The first milestone was 
the 1888 Law, no. 5849, which instituted the national health service and unified the different codes 
of pre-Unification states, among which, the health code of the Southern Kingdom was the most 
backward (Vicarelli 1997). It may not be a coincidence that, according to our data, convergence be-
gan only after the 1888 Law. Among the others, the Law also introduced obligatory vaccination 
against smallpox, which paved the way to its complete eradication. Indeed, compulsory vaccination 
proved to be more difficult to be implemented in the South, where some regions remained the most 
affected by the disease still in the 1920s (Mortara 1925). However, compulsory smallpox vaccina-
tion reached everyone in the country, so much so that in 1977 could be declared as no longer neces-
sary. This case may be taken as exemplary of passive modernization: progress came from abroad 
(from the national State, in turn from Napoleonic France), backward South was less prone to accept 
it, but finally it did and thus converged towards the rest of country. 
Health policies had positive consequences on life expectancy whenever they could. Yet there 
are some death causes overwhelmingly determined by “exogenous” factors – industrialization, ur-
banization or alimentation – against which public intervention can do few, or less: these causes are 
mainly chronic diseases such as tumours and cardiovascular diseases, but also, in the XIX and still 
in the first half of the XX century, pellagra and wasting disease; but here the Southern regions 
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scored lower values than the rest of the country, probably due to better environmental and cultural 
conditions.8  
Finally, since its creation, in 1970, the regional polity was progressively entrusted with the 
health policy; after the establishment of the National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) 
in 1978 (Law no. 883), the role played by different local institutions increased. There was more 
room for active modernization, but this was dramatically lacking in Southern regions, where there is 
plenty of evidence for increasing costs and inefficiency. To put in the way Acemoglu and Robinson 
would, this difference is due to the fact that in the Mezzogiorno the extractive political institutions, 
emblematic of passive modernization, used their increased power to distribute funds to their fac-
tions, in nepotistic ways.9 
4.3. Education 
 The new estimates for the Italian macro-areas are shown in Table 3. From the huge divide soon 
after Unification, convergence took place throughout hundred years. In the second half of the XIX 
century it proceeded at quite a slow rate, but then accelerated in the first half of the XX century, and 
continued in the 1950s and 1960s: as a consequence, by 1971 the North-South divide was practical-
ly filled. Since then, although differences tend to smooth down over time, as most of the population 
gets literate, convergence slowed down, and thus in the following three decades regional differences 
remained largely unchanged, very mild nonetheless. 
 
Table 3. Macro-area inequality in education, according to the hybrid HDI component, 1871-2007 
(Italy=1) 
Macro-areas 1871 1891 1911 1931 1938 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2007 
North-West 1.765 1.572 1.339 1.131 1.124 1.089 1.036 1.024 1.011 0.996 0.995 0.996 
North-East 1.104 1.183 1.189 1.101 1.101 1.043 1.016 1.030 1.011 1.005 1.011 1.003 
Centre 0.951 0.976 1.052 1.018 1.033 1.029 1.027 1.036 1.035 1.040 1.039 1.036 
South 0.609 0.639 0.699 0.808 0.859 0.884 0.931 0.938 0.961 0.974 0.975 0.980 
Islands 0.499 0.607 0.745 0.802 0.862 0.906 0.943 0.951 0.973 0.985 0.987 0.986 
Sources: our elaborations from various sources; for full details see the Appendix, Table A2. 
 
The first Law on compulsory education, issued in 1859 (Legge Casati), prescribed two years of 
free and compulsory elementary school, but left to the municipalities the burden of financing prima-
ry school. During the Liberal age regional differences were reduced, thanks to State intervention, 
and yet with dramatic delays, due to the fact that to the local authorities some degree of active mod-
                                                 
8
 Felice (2007, p. 377). The diffusion in the Southern regions of the Mediterranean diet, which provides a wide use of 
olive oil, may have had positive effects. Conversely, in the Northern regions there was a large use of animal fats which 
have negative effects on cardiovascular diseases . However, the diffusion of the Mediterranean diet in the Southern re-
gion was not widespread to all social classes and geographical areas (Teti 1998). 
9
 Such a falling back has continued and even increased in the last few years: if in 2007 there were 0.3 years of diffe r-
ence between Southern Italy and Centre-North (81.6 versus 81.9), in 2011 they are 0.9 (81.4 versus 82.3). Data for 2011 
are from Istat (2014). 
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ernization was required. Indeed, the historical evidence indicates that Southern municipalities were 
much less keen to tax and spend for local basic services, including education (Vasta 1999; Battilani 
2001). A’Hearn, Auria and Vecchi (2011, p. 166) suggest that lower investments in education dur-
ing the liberal age were primarily a product of the lack of willingness, rather than a result of the 
scarcity of resources: through an analysis at the provincial level for 1881, the authors show that the 
revenues coming from surcharges on land taxes − in comparison with those coming from surcharg-
es on consumption taxes − were in the South significantly lower than in the North, and in line with 
the differences in the expenditures for education. Since both the surcharges were decided at the mu-
nicipal level, this means that local landowners (who ruled municipalities) taxed themselves much 
less in the South than in the North, and as a consequence of this the Southern areas had less re-
sources to invest in education.10 However, it is worth noticing that the land taxes were fixed at the 
national level, relying on the available cadastres of the pre-Unification states, and they resulted 
lower in the South also because the assessment of land values was less accurate being cadastres 
largely obsolete (Parravicini 1958). Lack of willingness and the inadequateness of cadastres, which 
made the Southern municipalities less able to collect resources, could be seen as two different, alt-
hough related, mechanisms.11  
Overall, these results point towards a passive attitude of local elites in the South, which con-
trasts with an active involvement in the North. In broad terms, they are in line with an established 
international literature which stresses the link, in agrarian contexts, between high wealth inequality 
and lower investments in public schools (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000; Galor, Moav and Vollrath 
2009). Clear evidence emerges from many Ministerial inspections reported in the «Torraca» inquiry 
(Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione 1897). For example in Abruzzo, the inspector assigned to that 
area did not find a person who would have accompanied him on a school visit and, indeed, he re-
ported that “nobody was interested in how the schools worked”.12 According to another inspector, 
as reported in the «Torraca», in Sicily the lower class liked education, while upper class are “not yet 
resigned to see their children sit at the same desks with peasant children”.13 
The decentralization of primary education appears to be a typical case of a failure to modernize 
the country because political actors have a cognitive deficit and were not fully conscious of the situ-
                                                 
10
 The creation of a new national cadastre was an extremely slow process and ended only in 1956. The issue of local 
taxes in the first decades after unification is widely discussed in Volpi (1962).  
11
 This issue is really intriguing and deserves to be deepened by looking at local budgets. 
12
 “…tutti hanno faccende più importanti a cui accudire, e le scuole vadano come vogliono” (Ministero della Pubblica 
Istruzione 1897, p. 20). 
13
 “… i possidenti non [erano] ancora rasseganti a vedere di buon occhio i proprio figliuoli seduti agli stessi banchi coi 
figliuoli dei contadini” (Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione 1897, p. 20). From the inquiry there are plenty of cases 
which could be cited. One concerns the heating of the schoolrooms, which was made through cast -iron stoves in the 
Northern regions, through the “medieval brazier, which does not heat up and contaminates the air” in the Southern ones 
(Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione 1897, p. 19).  
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ation of Southern regions. Indeed, the Legge Casati was thought for the smaller and richer Kingdom 
of Sardinia and not for Italy as a whole. It was the «Corradini» inquiry (Ministero della Pubblica 
Istruzione 1910), which made failure patent to political actors, by showing that still there was a sig-
nificant North-South gap: for example in per capita expenditures, in the number of schools per pu-
pil, as well as in the amount of mortgages taken out by local municipalities in order to finance edu-
cation. As a consequence, in 1911 a Law (Legge Daneo-Credaro), which largely changed the sys-
tem, was issued: this increased funds and prescribed the gradual transfer of costs and duties from 
the municipalities to the State. A recent research by Cappelli (2013) sheds further light on these is-
sues. Cappelli maintains that the decentralized system established by the Legge Casati of 1859 
caused an “human capital trap” for the poorer areas of the country, particularly in the Southern re-
gions. The escape from this trap, or at least its loosening, was possible only with the Legge Daneo-
Credaro of the 1911, which constituted a step forward for the entire system. 
Passive modernization was fully at work in Southern Italy. Indeed, in the interwar period the 
South’s convergence finally included also the most backward areas: not because local administra-
tions had become aware and capable of performing their duties, rather because these very duties 
were levied out from them and taken on by the State. The incomplete convergence is confirmed by 
other indicators such as the number of libraries, of book published, of newspapers. In these indica-
tors the divide between Southern Italy and the rest of the country increased, from Unification until 
the last decades of the XX century (Raspadori 2011). 
Southern Italy kept on converging in the second half of the XX century, but this process slowed 
down in the last decades, as happened for life expectancy. This was when higher education became 
more important and it is indeed in higher education that the Southern regions continued to lag be-
hind. Not by chance, higher education was now more strongly entrusted to local authorities: for in-
stance, for what regards university, from the 1970s autonomy was increasingly allowed to local ad-
ministrations, but this hardly improved the Southern figures (Felice 2012). What is more important, 
“real” differences in education between Southern and other regions are probably worse than what 
the mean years of schooling or the enrolment rates may report, as indicated by PISA (Programme 
for International Student Assessment) data, which measure the knowledge and skills of 15-years-old 
students (OECD 2010). 
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4.4. Resources 
Table 4 presents the resource component of HDI calculated by combining data of nominal GDP 
per capita with regional price deflators.14 Around the time of Unification, regional differences in per 
capita GDP were not impressive, the Mezzogiorno hovering around 90% of the Italian average. Dur-
ing the Liberal age, the South fell back, although at a relatively slow rate. Most of the North-South 
differential arose in the interwar period, so much so that, by 1951, per capita GDP in the South had 
dropped to a mere two-third of the Italian average. Things changed with the “economic miracle”, 
when Southern Italy experienced the only period of significant convergence.15 In those years, the 
new Republic engaged into a massive regional policy in favour of the South, through the State 
agency called Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Scholars regard positively the infrastructural works of the 
first two decades (D’Antone 1997), and quantitative reconstructions suggest that the top-down in-
tervention in capital intensive sectors were of crucial importance in promoting the South’s conver-
gence,16 not least thanks to the role played by state-owned enterprises (Toninelli and Vasta 2011). 
Subsidized industrial plants, however, remained extraneous to the South’s economy, so much so 
that they were labelled as cattedrali nel deserto (“cathedrals in the wilderness”). This evidence fur-
ther supports the thesis of the passive modernization in order to explain convergence in per capita 
GDP, which lasted until the oil shock in 1973. 
 
Table 4. Macro-area inequality in real per capita GDP, 1871-2007 (Italy=1) 
Macro-areas 1871 1891 1911 1931 1938 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2007 
North-West 1.063 1.127 1.189 1.155 1.284 1.491 1.374 1.233 1.184 1.127 1.152 1.128 
North-East 0.966 0.922 0.966 0.955 0.971 1.113 1.156 1.113 1.172 1.167 1.163 1.174 
Centre 1.065 1.117 1.041 1.057 1.010 0.910 0.943 0.918 0.982 1.033 1.027 1.043 
South 0.946 0.884 0.864 0.851 0.775 0.685 0.729 0.824 0.801 0.815 0.793 0.782 
Islands 0.942 0.927 0.864 0.962 0.880 0.591 0.601 0.734 0.718 0.773 0.773 0.782 
Sources: our elaborations from various sources ; for full details see the Appendix, Table A3. 
 
The Cassa did not change the South society and indeed, ever more clearly from the 1970s on-
wards, even favoured a sort of “vicious circle”, which went from unproductive expenditures to mar-
ket failure (Trigilia 1992). Southern Italy began to (slightly) fall back again in terms of GDP since 
the 1970s, although it continued to receive massive State subsidies. Passive modernization can also 
explain this dismal end: once the top-down industrialization subsidized collapsed, the South’s polit-
                                                 
14
 We are aware that, in the new HDI formula, GNI is used instead of GDP. However, GDP is still used in the hybrid 
index: because reliable GNI historical estimates are very difficult to produce. For Italy, since GNI estimates would in-
clude remittances from emigrants, which became noteworthy from the 1890s and were more important in the South, 
GNI would probably reinforce the picture we are going to present. 
15
 There is now a large consensus among scholars about this long-run picture (e.g. Iuzzolino, Pellegrini and Viesti 
2013). For an explanation based on the role of geography and market potential, somewhat alternative to ours, see 
A’Hearn and Venables (2013). 
16
 From 1951 to 1971, most of the convergence in GDP per capita was due to prod uctivity (GDP per worker), particu-
larly in the industrial sector (Felice 2011, pp. 937-940). 
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ical and economic players preferred to adapt to a survival strategy, characterized by the redirection 
of State subsidies towards unproductive uses, mostly allocated through nepotism, and even illegal 
activities (Bevilacqua 1993, pp. 126-132). There is a striking contrast between this story and the one 
experienced by the North-Eastern and Central regions, which instead in the last decades of the XX 
century accelerated their convergence towards the North-West. By now we have a vast literature 
emphasizing the role of local institutions and civic engagement − i.e., active modernization − in fa-
vouring the economic rise of this area (Putnam 1993).  
5. On convergence, or the lack of it: determinants and counterfactuals 
Convergence was really complete only in life expectancy, for which passive modernization was 
easier. Where instead passive modernization was less easy, as in education, results were poor: this is 
more true considering that in education there were huge regional disparities and the potential for 
convergence was higher. For GDP, results were even more disappointing up to the point that in this 
case we don’t even record convergence in the absolute values, but divergence. 
By using the SRM (Figure 5), over the long-run there was not even convergence in HDI. We 
hold that the reason of the disappointing performance of Southern Italy is the lack of active modern-
ization. What instead if active modernization would have been at work also in the South and is-
lands? We can test this with a counterfactual exercise by assigning to these areas the same growth 
rate (from the SRM method) of the Centre-North, where there was instead active modernization. 
We make three different scenarios, as from Table 5: we hypothesize the same growth rate only in 
life expectancy (weak), in both life expectancy and education (medium), in all the three components 
(strong). The last rows of the Table show the percentage changes in the HDI of South and islands 
according to the three scenarios. These changes have been measured using two criteria: the change 
in absolute value, which brings out the impact when the value is low, and the change to close the 
distance to 1 that brings out the impact when the value is high.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Namely the change to close the distance to 1, which has the same formula as the SRM, is calculated as [(counterfac-
tualvalue − realvalue) / (1 – realvalue)]. 
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Table 5. Hybrid HDI for Italian macro areas, according to different hypotheses (1871-2007) 
Area 1871 1891 1911 1931 1938 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 2007 
Real values 
Centre-North 0.319 0.411 0.490 0.572 0.614 0.659 0.726 0.792 0.828 0.860 0.894 0.909 
South and islands 0.226 0.286 0.370 0.490 0.533 0.574 0.671 0.749 0.794 0.831 0.862 0.877 
Italy 0.282 0.360 0.442 0.546 0.582 0.631 0.709 0.778 0.817 0.850 0.883 0.899 
I hypothesis (weak): active modernization in life expectancy 
South and islands 0.226 0.308 0.392 0.503 0.545 0.584 0.670 0.748 0.791 0.831 0.864 0.880 
Italy 0.282 0.370 0.451 0.550 0.588 0.635 0.709 0.778 0.816 0.850 0.884 0.900 
II hypothesis (medium): active modernization in life expectancy and education 
South and islands 0.226 0.335 0.430 0.521 0.561 0.585 0.664 0.754 0.791 0.827 0.864 0.881 
Italy 0.282 0.379 0.465 0.551 0.593 0.631 0.703 0.778 0.815 0.847 0.883 0.900 
III hypothesis (strong): active modernization in life expectancy, education, and resources  
South and islands 0.226 0.338 0.437 0.527 0.574 0.617 0.692 0.770 0.810 0.843 0.882 0.900 
Italy 0.282 0.380 0.467 0.553 0.597 0.641 0.711 0.782 0.820 0.852 0.889 0.905 
Changes in the index of South and Islands: I hypothesis 
% change in absolute value - 7.7 5.9 2.7 2.3 1.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3 
% change to close the distance to 1 - 3.1 3.5 2.5 2.6 2.3 -0.3 -0.4 -1.5 0.0 1.4 2.4 
Changes in the index of South and Islands: II hypothesis 
% change in absolute value - 17.1 16.2 6.3 5.3 1.9 -1.0 0.7 -0.4 -0.5 0.2 0.5 
% change to close the distance to 1 - 6.9 9.5 6.1 6.0 2.6 -2.1 2.0 -1.5 -2.4 1.4 3.3 
Changes in the index of South and Islands: III hypothesis  
% change in absolute value - 18.2 18.1 7.6 7.7 7.5 3.1 2.8 2.0 1.4 2.3 2.6 
% change to close the distance to 1 - 7.3 10.6 7.3 8.8 10.1 6.4 8.4 7.8 7.1 14.5 18.7 
Sources: our own elaborations. Note: the cells are emphasized in white up to the threshold of 0.5, light gray from 0.5 to 
0.8 and dark gray over 0.8; moreover, the values which passed the threshold of 0.9 are in white color. 
 
This scheme follows our results that for Southern Italy convergence was more difficult in re-
sources, but less in education and even less in life expectancy. Moreover, we are able to identify 
two different periods. The first one goes roughly from Unification up to the 1930s, when the highest 
improvements for Southern Italy come from incorporating the SRM growth of the Centre-North in 
the social dimensions: this means that, although in those decades Southern Italy experienced con-
vergence in social indicators, much more could be done, and this is particularly true for education in 
the Liberal age. The second period goes from the 1930s to present, when the improvement for South 
and Islands comes mainly from the resource component. With active modernization only in the two 
social dimensions (II hypothesis), as early as by 1891 Southern Italy would have ranked, in terms of 
human development, above ESP and Japan, rather than below. In general, the improvements ob-
served would have died away in the following decades. From 1981 onwards, the only noticeable 
change is produced by active modernization also in resources: by 2007, Southern Italy would have 
reached that longed-for threshold of 0.9, thus joining the very-high-development club, only with ac-
tive modernization in all the three components. 
However, it must be pointed out that there was a dynamic interaction between the three dimen-
sions. They certainly have influenced each other and their causal linkages may also have changed 
along the period. For instance, there is a vast debate about the effects of improvements in life ex-
pectancy on GDP growth (Galor and Weil 2000), recently pointing towards a non-monotonic rela-
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tionship: a negative, although insignificant, impact of life expectancy on GDP before the onset of 
the demographic transition, a positive and significant one afterwards (Cervellati and Sunde 2011). 
This non-monotonic relationship seems to fit quite well with the estimates presented. The case for 
the impact of education on GDP is more compelling, not only because of the huge international lit-
erature stressing the contribution of human capital to economic growth, but also because there is ev-
idence for the Italian case: it has been argued (Vasta 1996; Felice 2012) that higher human capital 
played a crucial role in the forging ahead of the North-West of the peninsula, during the first half of 
the XX century. In this respect, it can be hold that if Southern Italy would have converged sooner 
and firmly in the education component of HDI during the liberal age, its falling back in GDP per 
capita in the interwar years could have been less severe: active modernization in education could 
have favoured active modernization in GDP as well; or, in other words, the human capital trap in-
stigated a vicious cycle which was visible in the GDP component of HDI. The falling back of the 
last decades may have been reinforced by the fact that education and resources influenced each oth-
er, and that both in turn may have had an impact on life expectancy. 
6. Conclusions  
This article offers an interpretative hypothesis to account for the Italian different regional pat-
terns: it is based on the distinction between passive and active modernization, which in turn can be 
respectively associated to the presence of extractive or inclusive institutions. 
At the regional level, active modernization stems from the role of local actors, whereas passive 
modernization is due to State intervention with limited, or null, involvement of local elites. Evi-
dence from Italy’s regions shows that passive modernization in favour of the Southern regions was 
implemented first in life expectancy (mostly during the Liberal age), then in education (approxi-
mately during the interwar years), finally in GDP (in the second half of the XX century). Overall, 
results indicate high convergence in the case of life expectancy, uncompleted convergence in educa-
tion, divergence in GDP. 
Convergence in HDI was more intense in the interwar years and during the Golden age. On this, 
the Italian Mezzogiorno seems to show a similar pattern than the world periphery: Prados de la Es-
cosura (2014) has found analogous results for what concerns the convergence of Latin America, 
Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe towards OECD countries; furthermore, this was mainly due to the 
social components, as with Southern Italy.  
In the case of Italy, this poor outcome may be due to two different reasons. Firstly, even passive 
modernization in Southern Italy was far from satisfactory: this is particularly true for the education 
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component, where much more could have been done in the Liberal age, being State intervention ful-
ly at work only from 1911 onwards with the centralization of the system. Secondly, passive mod-
ernization made the economic and social system of Southern Italy more fragile, thus more subject to 
external shocks. The 1970s crisis was particularly harmful to the South, which since then stopped 
its convergence and never recovered. More in general, during the last decades, Italy as a whole 
lagged behind the rest of the advanced countries, which also means that the Italian state was in turn 
less capable of promoting passive modernization in the Mezzogiorno; at the same time, local author-
ities were entrusted with more autonomy and power, which only highlighted the persisting indiffer-
ence of Southern elites towards modernization. By looking at the interaction amongst the three 
components, we have seen as improvements in life expectancy are not able to produce positive re-
sults in GDP, as suggested by the recent literature on economic growth; on the other hand, the weak 
convergence in education is confirmed to be one of the main causes of the divergent pattern on 
GDP of the Southern regions (if not of the entire country, for the last decades).  
Some questions remain open. Why at a certain stage of its pattern Southern Italy was not capa-
ble of moving from passive to active modernization? Would really more investment in education 
have been the key for success, or something more and different was needed: such as much more so-
cial capital, i.e. some change in culture and values? Was and is it possible for the State to promote 
the conditions which favour active modernization at the regional level? Such issues fill the agenda 
for future research. 
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